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Introduction 
 
Ever since microfinance was popularized in the mid-1970s in 
Bangladesh, one of its salient features has been the overwhelming 
representation of women. The trend has increased steadily, 
particularly during the 1980s. According to 2006 Microcredit 
Summit Campaign report, seven out of ten microfinance clients are 
women.
2
 Millions of these women are married or live with a 
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partner, and many have children. Relative to initial lending 
practices by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the bias in favor of 
loans to women in microfinance has been accompanied by an 
increasing trend to exclude men from microfinance services, 
particularly in the context of loans to those with very low income 
levels. The practice of exclusion might however prove to be 
counterproductive, for it can generate frictions within households, 
as men feel increasingly threatened in their role as primary 
breadwinners within the household.
3
  
 
In this paper we argue that the promotion of women in 
microfinance initiatives and the bias against men is taking place in 
the absence of solid empirical evidence on the effects of this 
approach on the balance of power in households and on the health, 
education and well-being of all household members.  We hold 
these to be key aspects of development.  We further argue that this 
issue deserves empirical attention given the possibility of 
unforeseen outcomes and adverse consequences that run counter to 
the goal to encourage microfinance initiatives as a means to 
promote development.  
 
To clarify the central issues, on the one hand, higher household 
income in the hands of women might increase health and education 
for women and their household members –we call this the women-
empowerment effect. On the other hand, the exclusion of men from 
access to subsidized finance might create frictions, and rebound 
effects that diminish the supportive role women play for their 
spouses and wider household members in the production of health 
and education – we call this the women-disempowering effect. In 
the event that the latter effect dominates over the former, then 
subsidized microfinance for women might have no overall positive 
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impact, or even worse, a negative impact on health and education 
at the household level and the women in low-income households. 
4
 
  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview 
of what we currently know about microfinance, gender, health and 
education in the context of Bangladesh, where most research has 
been conducted. Second, some anecdotal evidence from 
Bangladesh and Africa on the notion of microfinance 
empowerment is presented and discussed.  This raises questions 
about the influence of institutional structures and norms on the 
enhanced capacity of women to assert their role as the main 
providers of health and education, mainly arising from the fact that 
the empowerment of women generates frictions with their partners, 
which in turn leads to a potential disempowerment effects.
5
 Third, 
anecdotal evidence from Chiapas in southern Mexico is outlined, 
which provided the basis for empirical research on new approaches 
to microfinance now being undertaken in the region. Fourth, the 
essay outlines this experimental intervention in southern Mexico, 
where the women borrowers in a microfinance initiative can invite 
their spouses to be part of women-only solidarity groups as 
borrowers, in order to see whether potential frictions could be 
eliminated as a way enhance women empowerment and provide 
for improved access to health and education at the household level.  
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The main challenges of implementing this type of intervention, 
which were revealed through the experience are described. The 
final section spells out some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
1. Current knowledge of microfinance, financial resources and 
gender as a basis for the pro-women bias
6
 
 
The most influential empirical study on microfinance and gender 
can be found in an article published by the Journal of Political 
Economy in 1998 by Mark Pitt and Shahidur Khandker. In their 
study, Pitt and Khandker develop a framework for estimating the 
impact of microfinance using cross section data from Bangladesh 
for 1991-92. The paper pins down the potential sources of bias, in 
identifying and estimating the impacts of microfinance initiatives 
alone on outcomes such as household expenditures on health and 
education.  
 
For example, Pitt and Khandker address the bias that might arise 
because the individuals who self-select into microfinance programs 
may be the least poor and most entrepreneurial members of their 
community.  This bias would lead to an overestimate of the overall 
potential of microfinance on poverty reduction.  Pitt and Khandker 
faced the well-known endogeneity problem that entrepreneurial 
individuals may deliver better incomes for them, which in turn 
enable them to qualify for further loans, which in turn increase 
their incomes. Typical ways to resolve this problem of estimating 
the aggregate effect of microfinance initiatives is through the use 
of an instrumental variable, which does not correlate with 
outcomes. Pitt and Khandker used land-ownership as the 
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independent variable:  to qualify for a microfinance loan, 
individuals (both men and women) had to be poor as proxied by 
their holdings of land not being more that a half an acre.  They 
used this instrumental variable in studies that compared villages 
with microfinance opportunities and control villages without.    
This approach meant that those who received loans in treatment 
villages did so because they were landless poor, with the same 
entrepreneurial abilities as those in the control villages where the 
landless poor did not access microfinance loans, possibly because 
there was not much microfinance activity at the time. Once village 
characteristics were controlled for, Pitt and Khandker extended 
their analysis to the role of gender.  
  
 
In particular, Pitt and Khandker showed that when a loan of 100 
taka was extended to men it translated into 11 taka going into 
household expenditures (for food/nutrition/working tools), while 
the same amount lent to women household heads led to 18 taka 
being spent on household expenditures (for food/nutrition/working 
tools).  
 
It would be too bold to claim that the findings by Pitt and 
Khandker alone have influenced the bias toward women 
underpinning recent microfinance initiatives. It is our conjecture 
that in the absence of any countervailing empirical evidence, Pitt 
and Khanker findings contributed to the norms and operational 
practices of Grameen Trust, The Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest (CGAP- World Bank), as well as many other donor 
agencies and multilateral organizations engaged in providing seed 
capital and subsidized microfinance.  Their priority has been to 
direct subsidized loans to women.  
 
 6 
The common practice  in favor of women in subsidized microloans 
also flows from the research on the practice of delivering aid to 
women. For example food stamps in the United Kingdom and Sri 
Lanka, and staple food and cash deliveries under the PROGRESA 
(now called OPORTUNIDADES) program in Mexico were 
directed to women rather than their spouses. This was done for fear 
that if such aid was given to men, they might sell the food stamps 
and mis-spend the resources, possibly wasting money on gambling, 
tobacco, and alcohol (Armendáriz-Morduch (2005)).   
 
There are a number of empirical studies on the practice of targeting 
aid to women. Emmanuel Skoufias (2001) reports that the 
OPORTUNIDADES project aimed at women in rural Mexico led 
to sharp improvements in social outcomes: poverty decreased by 
10 percent, school enrollment increased by 4 percent, food 
expenditures increased by 11 percent, and adults‟ health (as 
measured by the number of unproductive days due to illness) also 
improved considerably.
7
 
 
Duncan Thomas (1990) reports that child health in Brazil (as 
measured by survival probabilities, height-for-age, and weight-for-
height) along with household nutrient intakes, tended to rise if 
additional non-labor income was in the hands of women rather 
than men.  He observed that income in the hands of a mother had, 
on average, 20 times the impact of the same income in the hands of 
a father with respect to children‟s survival probabilities.  In a 
subsequent study, also on Brazil, Thomas (1994) reports that 
increases in the share of the household budget spent on health, 
education, and housing as well as improvements in child health are 
associated with increasing the bargaining power of women.  
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 Promoting women to powerful positions in villages and regions may, by the same token, bring social 
benefits.   In a recent paper on India, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo (2003) show that by 
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Patrice Engle (1993) similarly studies the relationship between a 
mother‟s and father‟s income on child nutritional status (height-
for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height) for hundreds of 
households in Guatemala, and reports that children‟s welfare 
improves as women‟s earning power increases relative to their 
husbands‟.  Paul Schultz (1990) finds that in Thailand non-labor 
income in the hands of women tends to reduce fecundity more than 
when that non-labor income possessed by men. He also finds that 
the impact of non-labor income has different effects on labor 
supply, depending on which household member controls that 
income.
8
 
 
Anderson and Baland‟s (2002) article on Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) reports on a survey of hundreds of 
women in Kenya. An overwhelming majority of the women 
responded that the principal objective for joining a ROSCA was to 
save money, and nearly all of the respondents were married.  
Anderson and Baland conclude that an important motive for 
women joining ROSCAs is found in the desire to keep money 
away from their husbands. Other studies, not necessarily confined 
to ROSCAs, suggest that savings motives (and by that it is 
understood the protection of assets) also apply to women‟s 
involvement in microfinance institutions. 
 
Christopher Udry‟s (1996) research on agricultural practices in 
Burkina Faso provides evidence on the ways men and women 
invest in agriculture.  Using panel data, and after having controlled 
for soil quality and other variables, he finds that agricultural 
productivity is higher in plots cultivated by men than women.  He 
also finds that compared with plots cultivated by women, the 
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higher yields of plots cultivated by men are due to the application 
of different cultivation techniques, particularly a higher intensity of 
productive inputs (including fertilizer and child labor).  He thus 
concludes that productivity differentials are attributed to the 
intensity of production between plots cultivated by men and 
women and not to inherent skill differentials.  Udry regards this 
outcome as inefficient since there are sharply diminishing returns 
to the use of fertilizer.  Not only are resources not fully shared, 
they are allocated in ways that diminish total household income. 
Udry suggests that reallocating inputs to plots cultivated by women 
can thus enhance efficiency. Another solution (that is, the 
microfinance solution) is to provide women with credit sufficient 
to purchase additional inputs.  A second way that microfinance can 
potentially address problems like this is by tackling the social 
norms that prevent women from having adequate access to inputs 
and marketing facilities in the first place.  This might be done 
through demonstration effects and from pressure created by the 
microlender to ensure higher returns to borrowers‟ investments.  
 
From the point of view of evidence from practice, a field loan 
officer will generally see women as better customers for loans 
compared with men for at least four reasons. First, repayment rates 
on loans by women are higher, because women are more risk 
averse and therefore more conservative in their investment 
strategy. Also, women are more susceptible to pressure from their 
peers peer and more sensitive to the threat of public humiliation 
with regards to failure in the repayments on their loans, women 
have fewer opportunities than men to access alternative sources of 
credit, which in turn reduces the scope for moral hazard
9
. 
Moreover, field practitioners in microfinance argue that women are 
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less argumentative, which reduces the transaction costs of the loan, 
both for their peers and the bank.  Women also lower the agency 
costs of bank officers because women‟s groups are more punctual 
at repayment meetings, which avoids the bank officer having to 
devote time looking for them at their homes/businesses. Last but 
not least, women loan officers cost less than men, and in many 
instances women are more efficient at granting and collecting 
repayments.
10
  
 
Taken together, the findings of empirical investigations, the 
perspectives of donors, and experience of practitioners, have led to 
an established wisdom in favor of lending to women. Moreover, 
the conventional wisdom has been that to exclude men from 
microfinance has no significant or important detrimental outcomes.  
However, more recent views from the field expressed at the recent 
Microfinance Forum in Beijing (2006) suggest otherwise: 
 
“…male exclusion can lead to negative consequences for women 
who join financial services: they may meet resistance from men 
who see their exclusive participation as unfair and threatening; 
their loans may be hijacked…A family whose adult members all 
have access to financial services is better off than one where half 
are ineligible.” 
Hugh Allen, 
Microfinance 
Forum, 2006 
 
While the experiential knowledge of people like Hugh Allen 
should not be accepted without detailed investigation, his views are 
supported by concerns voiced for some time now by social 
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scientists and anthropologists.  Their observations, which run 
counter to conventional wisdom, are reviewed in the following 
section.  
.  
 
 
2. Anecdotal Evidence from Bangladesh and Africa 
 
In this section, we argue that there are potential dangers in 
excluding men from subsidized microfinance as this may lead to 
frictions between household heads, leading to lower quality and 
quantity of health and education provision within the overall 
household unit. At this stage the evidence for this position is 
anecdotal, deriving from Bangladesh and Africa.  It suggests that 
there is a need to take into account the potential danger of 
excluding the men head of household from microfinance, as their 
exclusion can overburden women, and lower health and education 
outcomes.   
 
 
Long before the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the 
creator of Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus, for his work in 
microfinance, household surveys from Bangladesh, dating back to 
1999, documented evidence that microfinance was increasing 
frictions between husbands and wives, as husbands often felt 
threatened in their primary role as income earners (Rahman 
(1999)). Moreover, well-known evidence, from Bangladesh, 
suggests that microfinance does not increase women‟s bargaining 
power entirely, because on average, women borrowers surrender 
nearly 40 percent of their control over the investment decisions 
they make to male household members. More alarmingly, over 90 
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percent of the returns these women realize from their investments 
are handled by their husbands (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). 
 
In Africa, Linda Mayoux (1999), reports on a survey of 15 
different microfinance programs.  She finds that the degree of 
women‟s empowerment is household- and region-specific, with 
women‟s empowerment often strongly influenced by prevailing, 
somewhat inflexible, social norms and traditions.  These findings 
have to be weighed against the fact that impacts on empowerment 
also depend on how well particular microfinance programs are 
designed. These findings suggest that empowerment and 
development outcomes are a multilevel issue, in which the 
aggregate outcomes of microfinance on development are 
influenced by factors at household level, the design of the 
microfinance initiative at the local level and social and institutional 
factors at the regional level.  The influence of context factors and 
program design on empowerment outcomes leads to the 
exceedingly preliminary observations from a field experiment 
undertaken in southern Mexico by Beatriz Armendáriz, Dean 
Karlan, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 
 
3. Anecdotal evidence from field experiments in southern 
Mexico
11
 
 
Grameen Trust Chiapas, AC (henceforth called GTC) is one of the 
first replications of the Grameen model of microfinance in Latin 
America.  The project is located in the highlands of southern 
Mexico. It deploys funds from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) via Grameen Trust 
Bangladesh.  The replication in southern Mexico, began in 1997 by 
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lending to women-only groups.
12
 In 2003, in sharp contrast to the 
original Grameen model, GTC took the risk of lending to men of 
some previously women-only groups. Since then the organization 
grew rapidly, and it now has over 12,000 borrowers in different 
groups, with a large majority of mixed-groups of women and men. 
 
When branch managers in different geographical locations in the 
southern Mexican replication are asked why they have accepted 
men into women only groups, four explanations are offered. The 
first relates to informational asymmetries between men and 
women.  One loan officer argues that even if loan disbursements 
and repayments are publicly known in women only groups, men 
tend to overestimate the amount of money that women are 
handling.  They therefore decide to contribute less to overall 
household expenditure, which often creates frictions within the 
household. This has dynamic effects.  In many instances, women 
under these conditions no longer use their loans purely for 
investment but divert some to make up for these shortfalls in the 
allocation for normal household expenditures on food, health, and, 
education (particularly in the month of August when the academic 
year starts).  They also quarrel more often with their husbands who 
are no longer providing as much for these expenditures as they 
used to. Inviting some men to join the group allows them to have a 
more accurate estimate of women‟s real investments and their 
realized returns.  With this information they are less likely to 
reduce their contributions to household expenditures. In those 
groups that became mixed, the improvements in information were 
accompanied by women borrowers investing more, and increased 
repayment rates by both men and women.  
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A second explanation relies on the potential work-load 
externalities of having women as the only recipients of loans 
within the household. For example, another loan officer argues that 
when women contract a loan from GTC, they become busier, and 
that the quality of the services that women traditionally provide to 
the household such as meals, and household chores, decreases in 
quantity or quality or both.  This, the bank manager argues, 
irritates men and creates a “tense” atmosphere within the 
household.  This family tension causes women to default more 
often or prevents them from making their repayments on time. In 
contrast, when men are invited to join groups, they seem to 
internalize the negative work-load externalities created by GTC 
microloans to women. In the loan officer, Mr. Regis Ernesto 
Figueroa‟s own words: “invited men help more their spouses in 
their businesses and in household chores, which in turn, reduces 
tensions, and enable women to repay on time, because men become 
de-facto business partners of women”. 
 
A third explanation relates to the absence of secure places for 
women to hide money while they save for two consecutive weeks 
in order to make the repayments on their loans to GTC. Another 
loan officer argues that women cannot open bank accounts in 
commercial banks as these banks do not accept their very small 
savings, because the transaction costs for the commercial banks are 
too high relative to the amounts deposited. Women borrowers of 
GTC therefore hide the money for their repayments away from 
their husbands in different places, generally in the house, because 
husbands might steal the money and use it for buying alcohol and 
tobacco. When men are invited to join the group, this loan officer 
argues, the situation changes because under the “Grameen Rules”, 
the man becomes responsible for the debt of the other men and 
women members of the group. “Women become happier. They no 
longer complain about their husbands or men in general. The 
 14 
household heads work harmoniously together”, the loan officer 
explains. 
 
A loan officer at the headquarters of GTC offers a fourth, and last, 
explanation of why men are invited into women‟s groups. She 
argues that the inclusion of men brings more women clients into 
the scheme, particularly more single women. She explains that the 
reason is because women generally face a trade off between being 
financially independent via a microloan from GTC, or, getting 
married. The argument goes that since GTC accepts men, women 
no longer face this trade off, and they are therefore more likely to 
become clients. Moreover, the inclusion of men, according to this 
loan officer, has increased marriage rates! 
 
 
4. Attempts to Measure Empowerment and Disempowerment
13
  
 
The anecdotal evidence set out above suggests a substantive need 
to explore in greater depth the relationship between microfinance 
structures and the issues of gender in development and 
empowerment around microfinance.  This calls for experiments 
designed to test the effects of the inclusion of male head of 
households into otherwise women-only solidarity groups.  Such 
experiments are exceedingly demanding to design and conduct.  
Nevertheless they are important given the challenges to the 
conventional wisdom, that women are increasingly empowered by 
microfinance that enables them to expand their businesses, earn a 
higher return so that their spouses would value them better, which 
translates into higher health and education provision for the 
household and in turn the wider community.  
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In designing such studies it is recognized that differences in social 
and institutional norms may impact the outcomes.  Ideally, any test 
of the empowering-disempowering hypothesis should therefore 
take place in different institutional contexts such as Bangladesh, 
Africa, and many other places in Latin America to establish 
whether the results are culturally and institutionally robust.  
However, finding partner microfinance institutions, which would 
allow researchers to conduct scientific experiments of this kind, is 
difficult enough, without the added challenge of multiple 
experiments in three continents involving multi-level research 
designs.   
 
We report here progress to date with a pioneering study developed 
by Harvard and Yale researchers from the Innovations for Poverty 
Action (IPA) in their continuing study on the impact of gender 
issues on microfinance and health and education outcomes 
undertaken in association with the Grameen Trust Chiapas, A.C., 
in southern Mexico. The elements of this study are reported below. 
 
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) researchers from Harvard 
and Yale designed a survey and a follow-up random experiment, 
using a sample of approximately 2000 borrowers in women only 
solidarity groups in 2006.  In this experiment married-women-
only-solidarity groups were (randomly) selected into treatments 
and controls. Control solidarity groups were not subject to any 
kind of “intervention” while the treatments were.  
 
The treatments were divided into four different sub-groups. 
Intervention in the first sub-group consisted of allowing women 
voluntarily to invite their partners/husbands to join the Grameen-
style solidarity group in order to acquire a microloan. The study 
sought to take into account the possible „network effects‟ that 
might follow as invited male spouses joined solidarity groups 
 16 
increasing the synergies through the span of group members.  IPA 
research design therefore allowed for sub-group of women who 
could invite other women friends to join their group. Similarly, it 
was recognized that as partners/spouses were invited to join, so 
household income would increase.  This factor was taken into 
account by extending larger-sized loans to a sub-group open to 
women only clients. Last but not least, a treatment sub-group was 
established consisting of women who could invite their 
partners/husbands under their control providing them high and low 
monetary incentives to better proxy women‟s marginal benefit 
from being financially independent. 
 
The researchers are using a follow-up survey of the four sub-
treatment groups and the control group to assess and evaluate any 
behavioral changes at household level. Some of the questions that 
the research is designed to resolve are: a) did women borrowers 
decide to invite their male spouses to join, and if so, did their 
willingness to do so increase as they were provided with 
incentives? In what way did the inclusion or male spouses alter 
outcomes in terms of health, education,  child labor,  and 
bargaining power, for example?  It is recognized that there are 
many other possible dimensions of change to address, but it is not 
possible to develop a more comprehensive set of questions until 
the initial results from the 2008 follow-up survey of behavioral 
changes are processed and analyzed. 
 
In the meantime, researchers have detected some interesting 
idiosyncrasies in the sample of borrowers, which include five 
geographical areas that are quite distant from one another.  
 
These preliminary observations show that in the bank branch with 
the highest proportion of indigenous population most of the 
decisions relating to investment and the expenditures from returns 
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realized from microloans are taken by men head of household, not 
by women.  It should be noted that Grameen Trust Chiapas, as well 
as other group–lending institutions such as AlSol, another 
Grameen replication founded by one of the authors of this article, 
have been serving borrowers in these branches/regions for a long 
time. The health and educational expenditures in these two 
branches do not differ considerably. If these longstanding 
microfinance initiatives to women had not already empowered 
women in such traditional societies, and assuming the head of 
household relationship is basically frictionless as wives 
systematically defer decision-making to their husbands, it is 
difficult to imagine what an intervention of the sort we undertook 
in that region could actually bring about in terms of further 
changes in behavioral patterns.  In other words empowerment and 
development outcomes may be constrained by prevailing social 
and institutional norms that are difficult to change through 
microfinance initiatives operating at the household level. 
 
For example, when the women in these branches are given the 
power to invite their spouses into the group this provides an 
empowering tool in its own right, and, household income is 
expected to increase when women actually decide to include their 
spouses. On the other hand we might expect that if any anticipated 
increase in household income, once partners are included as 
microfinance clients, is then controlled purely by men in line with 
prevailing norms, there would not be the expected improvements 
in outcomes, particularly with respect to health and education. If 
women understand these prevailing norms they might decide not to 
invite their spouses in the first place. It is however much too early 
in the experiment to make any predictions of substantive outcomes 
from the project. 
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A somewhat similar scenario seems to prevail in two more affluent 
branches and regions. Interestingly, in at least one of the two 
branches, women borrowers have remained with the Grameen 
Trust Chiapas for a much longer period of time compared to the 
other four branches. At this time their higher income and 
expenditure, on average, might be due to this continued 
microfinance activity, nevertheless, educational levels seem to be 
just as low as in the poorest branch, while it appears that health 
expenditures are somewhat higher. Whether women will opt for 
bringing their spouses in to the project, and whether this will 
translate into improved outcomes in terms of health and education 
remains an open question at this stage in the program. 
 
An interesting situation exists in the other two branches and 
regions where the income of the borrowers is the highest. Women 
in both these regions are not only wealthier, they are also more 
educated and their health expenditures appear to be higher. These 
women seem to be more empowered in that they often declare 
themselves as being the main household head, and take most of the 
household decisions. Moreover, their spouses seem to be more 
supportive of their microbusinesses. It is not clear if the higher 
degree of empowerment felt by women in these branches is due to 
the microfinance initiative, different prevailing social and 
institutional norms or a combination of both.  However, in this 
setting these women might value their financial independence, and 
if this independence has been accompanied by no increased 
friction in their household relationships, we should probably not 
expect these already empowered women to invite their partners to 
join the project. In the jargon of field experiments of this sort, take 
up might end up being low. Again, it is too early to tell as we do 
not yet know the level of take-up of male membership, nor do we 
know if the invitation of spouses to join will lead to improved 
 19 
outcomes in terms of expenditures on health or education, and 
women empowerment. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
At present the baseline survey in Chiapas indicates that the degree 
of women empowerment is in line with Linda Mayoux‟s (1999) 
findings in fifteen different microfinance programs in Africa.  That 
is to say expenditure on health and education is household and 
region-specific and inflexible as a consequence of social and 
institutional norms that seem exceedingly difficult to change and 
seem to dominate household level initiatives.  
 
However, empowering women via an additional tool, namely by 
giving them the possibility to voluntarily invite their partners into 
the group, might help to accelerate the process for change in those 
social and institutional norms. This might however prove more 
difficult in poorer regions where household decisions seem mostly 
to be dominated by men. The question then is why should 
subsidized loans that make women responsible for repayment, but 
do not give them power over crucial decisions regarding their 
business and household expenditures in health and education 
seems to be endorsed by donors? And, why microfinance programs 
focused on women at household level, due to the expected effects 
on empowerment and development outcomes, are not accompanied 
by policies that support women‟s empowerment at the social and 
institutional level? Moreover, as the microfinance industry 
becomes increasingly commercial, microcredit becomes 
increasingly burdensome on women. Why should women take on 
the responsibility for higher repayments in the first place? This 
view accords well with for-profit microfinance enterprises in Latin 
America where men are increasingly self-selecting themselves into 
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programs offered by such enterprises. In the absence of subsidies, 
Grameen Trust Chiapas as well as other organizations in the region 
might be increasingly attracting men, not women. And the interest 
rates charged could be “friendlier” to women, if only because 
women are the main brokers of health and education within the 
household. 
 
As far as the more affluent clients served by Grameen Trust 
Chiapas are concerned, it might be that the whole idea of excluding 
husbands can be counterproductive, because of informational 
asymmetries which appear to lead to mistrust, increased frictions 
between domestic couples, and worse: a decreased participation by 
men in overall household expenditures.  This outcome is not what 
we understand is a preferred outcome for women. However, such 
disempowerment effects should be weighed against the value that 
women attach to their financial independence. At the household 
level we see an important balance then between women‟s greater 
financial independence on one side, and more demands on time 
and loss of money for established levels of expenditure on the 
other. 
 
Given these scenarios women might be reluctant to invite their 
partners into their groups, but for different reasons. In the case of 
less affluent households in very traditional societies, having 
partners join the project would not change anything because of the 
inflexibilities created by prevailing social and institutional norms 
around roles in households in relation to decisions on expenditures. 
And in the case of relatively more affluent households because 
women attach too much value to their financial independence and 
that this independence is gained without any substantive losses to 
them in terms of empowerment. 
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Final results on take-up as well as potential behavioral changes 
from the treatments in this experiment on gender and 
empowerment effects should further clarify these questions and 
issues at the household level.  The study should also shed some 
light on the broader implications and outcomes of microfinance 
designs in relation to changed conditions at household and 
community levels.  Especially important will be the evidence of 
the extent to which the desired outcomes of microfinance programs 
are influenced or constrained by prevailing social and institutional 
norms. The study should reveal evidence on the relationship 
between gender, empowerment, and development as a basis to 
explore the policy implications of approaches to microfinance at 
household level linked to broader policies promoting women‟s 
empowerment in society. 
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